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Abstract
This research aims to analyze the impact of board gender diversity on dividend payments in
Indonesia. Indonesia is one of the emerging economies. Some of the institutional specificities
of emerging economies are the lack of protection of minority shareholders' rights, and market
uncertainty may increase agency problems that raise doubts about future cash flows such as
dividend payments. This research uses the data of listed firms from Indonesia Stock Exchange
over the period 2013-2016. The data collection method uses purposive sampling. Indonesia
implements a two-tier system that has directors and commissioners. We find evidence
indicating that women directors are negatively related to the dividend payment, while women
commissioners have positively related to the dividend payment. Moreover, we find that women
independent directors, women executive directors, and women executive commissioners are
positively associated with dividend payments, while women independent commissioners do
not have an effect on dividend payments. The sample in this study is limited because the
payment of dividends is not a necessity. This study provides the view that board gender
diversity can create systems that make better decisions and encourage women to have a chance
to participate in top management.
JEL: M40
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1. Introduction
Many previous researchers have studied the characteristics of board directors, like the size of
the board (Van Pelt, 2013), that can affect the dividend payment policy. However, research
examining the relationship between gender diversity and dividend payment is still scarce,
especially studies conducted in developing countries. Investors have had increasing concerns
about companies' returns in recent years, especially in developing countries. Characteristics of
a developing country include the lack of minority rights protection, broad government
ownership, and market uncertainties that make predictions about dividend policy difficult
(Saeed and Sameer, 2017).
Based on the agency theory, the manager can take the opportunity to harness the
company's resources for their own advantage. However, the owner also has the right to give a
limitation to the manager to protect the shareholders' rights. One of the ways to reduce this
agency problem is by making a dividend payment to the shareholders. The higher dividend
payment to the shareholders can prevent the cash from flowing to the manager (Ben-Nasr,
2015). Ang Fatemi and Tourani-Rad (1997) show that companies with abundant profits will
choose to retain their earnings because the returns earned from dividend payments may not be
as large as when the profit is reinvested. Based on that opinion, there is a tendency that the
company will hold cash and pay dividends with a small amount. Therefore, the shareholders
also try to protect their importance by insisting the company increase the independent board
and gender diversity in the company's management. According to Saeed and Sameer (2017),
board diversity and the existence of an independent board can protect the minority's rights and
also increase supervision to reduce the chance of resources take over by management.
Diversity is when people think differently (Saeed and Sameer, 2017). So, gender
diversity is expected to be able to make the process of decision-making based on different
points of view easier. Based on the research done by Grant Thornton Institution (2017), it is
found that men and women see the risk and opportunity from different points of view. The
attributes required to succeed in a top-level position, such as firmness, resilience, and
leadership skills, are closer to those usually associated with men, not women (Heilman, Block,
Martell, and Simon, 1989). As a result, women are often considered deficient in the qualities
required to succeed at the top level. The lack of conformity between the stereotypical attributes
of women and the requirements of this work leads to the conclusion that women are less able
to handle the jobs normally dominated by men. Such stereotypes can inhibit women's careers
from occupying top management. In general, men are considered more competitive, confident,
and braver in taking risks (Eckel, 2008). However, this result conflicts with the one stated by
Sila, Gonzalez, and Hagendorff (2015) that a board with more women (a higher female
proportion) takes no more or less risk-taking decisions than a board dominated by men. So it
is unclear whether men or women should have the same chance to be in top management
positions and whether they show the same likelihood of taking risks. Women seem to have a
comparative advantage related to product diversification and tasks related to communication
(Schubert, 2006). It is expected that a board's gender diversity can increase innovation and lead
to broader consideration in the process of decision-making (Amason, 1996; Chen, Liu, and
Tjosvold, 2005).
Some countries have special laws to encourage women's participation in the company's
board expected to be able to improve the financial performance. Some countries like Norway
apply a quota system requiring companies to have 40% women on their board to support the
gender equity of the workforce. Australia also applies gender diversity in their corporate
governance policy. In ASEAN, there are only a few countries applying gender diversity in their
corporate governance policy. In 2012, Indonesia was ranked 8th among countries that have
women who occupy the ranks of management. Below is the percentage of women working on
board in some countries:
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Figure1. The Percentage of Women Working in Management Board based on Countries
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Source: CGIO (2012)
Based on Figure 1, it can be summarized that Norway has the highest percentage of
women working in management, while Japan has the lowest. Compared to other countries in
ASEAN, Indonesia has the highest percentage of gender diversity compared to Malaysia and
Singapore. Based on the report issued by the consultation institution Grant Thornton in 2015,
ASEAN is in the second rank of the area, having the greatest number of women who work as
a director after East Europe. Countries in ASEAN have quite a high level of gender diversity,
such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. By 2015, the Philippines and Thailand were
able to outperform Indonesia by 39% and 37%, while Indonesia is at 36%. It is supported by
the women's emancipation movement demanding gender equity that encourages women to
keep going forth, have a high level of education, and have promising careers. Women are also
considered to have good performance and are able to maintain a good relationship with the
stakeholders. However, is it just by their existence the women directors and women
commissioners can affect the dividend payment? This research will investigate the effect of
women's existence in the directors and commissioner toward the dividend payment in
Indonesia over the period 2012-2016.
The existence of women on the board is expected to be able to reduce the agency
problem. The shareholders emphasize women's existence on the board because there is a belief
that women can understand the shareholders well. Women have a tendency towards a high
degree of carefulness and tend to avoid risks. Women can increase the likelihood of distributing
dividends, as they will demand more control mechanisms from the management team and make
better decisions that have positive impacts on shareholders. However, women also seem to be
more cautious in facing risks. Their attitude tends towards risk aversion and may be able to
affect the decision of the women director in approving various decisions related to the
company's welfare. According to Huang and Kisgen (2013), women directors are less skilled
in terms of debt management. Women directors are also less brave in making investments in
the uncertain market, so they tend to reduce the cash expenditure, like dividend payments and
hold the company's cash during the uncertain market period (Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List, 2002).
In fact, uncertain market conditions really tend to happen in countries with developing
economies. On the other hand, women also have superiority in building communication
channels creating harmony with the external stakeholders to reduce agency problems (Adams
and Ferreira, 2009) and ease of access to resources (Hillman, Canella, Jr, and Harris, 2002).
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Ease of access to resources can reduce the intentions of women directors and women
commissioners to withhold cash when market uncertainty occurs.
This study will focus on Indonesia as a country applying the two-tier system. The
application of a two-tier system also encourages many women in the upper echelon level
because there are both a board of directors and a board of commissioners. The writer chose
Indonesia because of two reasons. First, as explained by Ferry (2016) that Indonesia does not
have corporate governance guidelines discussing gender diversity. Even though there is no
special regulation, Indonesia has a high gender diversity level in ASEAN because of the twotier system application. Second, Indonesia is included as a developing country, so it tends to
be weak in terms of investor protection resulting in the uncertainty of dividend payment. Thus,
the writer wants to compare the effect of gender diversity on directors and commissioners
towards dividend payments in Indonesia.
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Agency Theory
Agency theory focuses on the conflict occurred in the company based on the contractual
relationship between the principal and agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Based on that
theory, the manager has the chance to take the chance by using the company's resources for
his/her own importance. However, the owner also has the right to limit the manager's
importance in protecting the shareholders' rights. One of the ways to reduce this agency
problem is by paying a dividend. According to Jensen (1986), dividend acts as a mechanism to
reduce agency problems arising from the conflict between the owner and management.
The existence of agency relationships can trigger internal parties to know more
information than external parties. If more corporate information is held by either party, the
emergence of asymmetric information will increase. Asymmetric information between the
owner and management will increase the agency problems resulting in the owners being
pessimistic about the future cash flow.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) provide the view that
companies with poor corporate governance will use dividend payouts as an alternative way to
build a company's reputation in the eyes of shareholders. To avoid this, shareholders demanded
gender diversity in both boards of directors and commissioners. Gender diversity at the board
level is believed to be able to give effective supervision to the management and tends not to
use the dividend as a tool for reputation building (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). It shows that
gender diversity can also reduce agency problems. By having a diverse board, the company is
expected to have better management which then can give stronger protection to the
shareholders. Generally, dividend policy is the most important thing in the context of
developing countries considering the government's weak condition and concentrated
ownership, so it is difficult for the minority shareholders to exert their rights. In that situation,
it is expected that the diverse board will be better able to protect the shareholders' rights.
2.2. Dividend Policy
Dividend payment policy is one of the most important conflicts between managers and
shareholders related to the free cash flow problem. A dividend policy is the sharing of cash or
stock with the shareholders. Based on Indonesian Law no 40/2007Article 70, the company can
distribute dividends if the company has positive earnings. The company must spare a certain
amount from its net profit each year as cash reserves at least 20% of the total amount of paidin capital and issued capital. The whole net profit, after being reduced by cash reserves, will be
shared with the shareholders as a dividend.
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According to the research done by Jensen (1986), the dividend can solve agency
problems. Paying a dividend can reduce the transfer of funds for the benefit of the manager,
not the interests of shareholders (Bradley et al., 1998). Stability of income is one of the most
important factors in making dividend decisions because of the company's concern about future
cash (Lintner, 1956). Managers tend to be reluctant to pay high dividends unless they are
confident of their cash flow ability to maintain such high dividends (Chay and Suh, 2009).
Companies that have high cash flow uncertainty will choose to pay low dividends for fear of
future cash shortfalls (Bradley et al., 1998; Chay and Suh, 2009).
2.3 Women's characteristics on boards
Currently, there are many motivations for the shareholders to increase the number of women
on the board, whether in the directors or commissary. It is because of women's characteristics
believed to be able to give an advantage to the shareholders. Women understand more about
what the shareholders want. Women on boards usually have a strong relationship with the
diverse society channel that implies ease in accessing resources (Hillman et al., 2000). The
easy access to resources is because women can build communication channels and harmony
with the external stakeholders to reduce the agency cost, gain support and also create legitimacy
in the external environment (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). A board with a greater proportion of
women shows superior financial management related to loan quality in the period after the
financial crisis (Ward and Forker, 2015) because women tend to take the right decision with
low risk.
The benefits of gender diversity in the board of directors or board of commissioners
can improve decision-making by taking in different perspectives (Adams and Ferreira, 2009).
In this case, women directors have superior financial analysis ability but tend to be less brave
in taking risks, while the male ones tend to be brave in taking risks, especially when the
company's finance is in critical condition. That is why gender diversity is expected to help in
taking an accurate decision with low risk. Board gender diversity can increase supervision
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Women directors also tend to work in committees related to
supervision more than male ones. Specifically, women tend to be put in charge of auditing
corporate governance. Board gender diversity can be used to improve the legitimacy and
reputation of the organization (Hillman et al., 2000). It also raises the company's value because
the existence of women on the board reflects that there is no gender discrimination in the
company, which will give a positive impression to the investors and society.
2.4 Hypothesis Development
2.4.1 The Proportion of Women Directors towards Dividend Payment
Women are also more cautious in facing risks. There are many disturbances that can raise
the chance of financial risks, like market uncertainty. Women directors tend to choose to hold
cash during market uncertainty periods to protect the company's finance. According to Marter
and Lighthall (2012), when faced with an uncertain condition, women tend to be afraid, while
men tend to be angry. Those emotions have an impact on decision-making, such as when
someone is afraid, she will try to reduce taking risks, while someone is angry, he will be brave
to take risks. This condition can also strengthen the belief that men tend to be brave in taking
risky decisions compared to women. De Cabo, Gimeno, and Neito (2012) investigate gender
diversity in the banking sector. The percentage of women in banking sector management is
believed to be low because it is prone to risks, and market conditions will be affected by each
decision made. The high risk related to the developing countries market and the tendency of
women directors to avoid risks make most women directors minimize the environmental risks
by holding cash and paying a low dividend (Saeed and Sameer, 2017).
7
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H1. The Proportion of Women Directors Negatively Affects the Dividend Payment Policy
2.4.2 The Proportion of Women Commissioner towards the Dividend Payment
The existence of women on the board is expected to be able to reduce agency problems
and improve corporate governance. Shareholders emphasize the existence of women on the
management board because there is a belief that women can understand shareholders well. The
existence of experienced women usually has a strong relationship with various societal
channels implying the advantage in access to resources (Hillman et al., 2000). It is possible
because women can build communication channels and harmony with the external stakeholders
to reduce agency costs at the board level and gain support and also create legitimacy in the
external environment (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Ease in accessing capital can prevent
commissioners from holding cash in times of crisis. In addition, women tend to focus on control
mechanisms (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng, 2011).The increase of the number of women in the
commissioner will make the probability of dividend payment will be greater because women
commissioners will demand more control mechanisms from the management team and also
make better decisions that have positive impacts on the shareholders.
H2. The Proportion of Women Commissioner Positively Affects the Dividend Payment
Policy
2.4.3 The Proportion of Independent Women Directors towards Dividend Payment
The stakeholders need a representative on the independent board to protect their assets.
Hillman et al. (2002) prove that most women directors come from a non-business career; they
often get to higher positions by showing professional performance and outstanding education.
It implies that women directors do not have any connection channel with other parties.
Independent directors are more conservative than internal ones and can help reduce agency
costs incurred from asymmetric information between the shareholder and manager. They have
the incentive to make the right decisions to defend the company's reputation (Probohudono,
Tower, and Rusmin, 2013). According to Zhu, Ye, Tucker, and Chan (2016), independent
directors can contribute to decision-making, and independent directors are considered more
courageous to confront management, especially related to finances. They can also limit the
manager's opportunistic behaviour, which often harms the shareholders. Thus, independent
women directors tend to choose to pay dividends than to hold the profit (Prasanna, 2014).
H3. The Proportion of Independent Women Directors Positively Affects the Dividend
Payment Policy
2.4.4 The Proportion of Independent Women Commissioners towards Dividend Payment
Independent parties are considered to be the optimal security of shareholder value by
closely monitoring the management team (Andrés, 2017). Independent commissioners can act
as good supervisors for shareholders' importance to reduce agency problems (Sharma, 2011).
Based on the research done by Adams and Ferreira (2009), women can monitor managers'
behaviour more effectively than men by monitoring through discussion and better
communication with the staff, and they can present a better independent thought. This is
important to be done to check opportunistic activities and give better control to the management
(Adams et al., 2010). Women independent commissioners exercise direct supervision of the
payment system to align shareholder and management interests such as dividends (Holmstrom
and Milgrom, 1994).This is done to align shareholder and management interests. Therefore,
more and more independent women commissioners will tighten supervisory management such
as by monitoring dividend payments.
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H4. The Proportion of Independent Women Commissioners Positively Affects the Dividend
Payment Policy
2.4.5 The Proportion of Women President Directors toward the Dividend Payment
Women executives tend to see the interests of the company from the point of view of
different shareholders, and they seem less concerned with their responsibility to distribute
dividends (Lintner, 1956). Many big projects require extra attention from a director than just
thinking about dividends. The women president directors can lower dividend payments because
they do not have the need to use the dividend payment as a supervising mechanism (Francis,
Hasan, Park and Wu, 2014). Moreover, Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2007) argue that women
presidential directors tend not to support dividend payment because this mechanism needs
much supervision of management activities. Van Pelt (2013) also supports the negative impacts
of dividend payment by the executive director in management.
H5. The Proportion of Women President Directors Negatively Affects the Dividend
Payment Policy
2.4.6 The Proportion of Women President Commissioner towards the Dividend Payment
The commissioner is in charge of overseeing the company's operations to fit the company's
goals. Taking into account the welfare of shareholders is one of the company's goals. According
to research by Petrides and Furnham (2006), there is no difference between the leadership style
of a women commissioner and a male commissioner, and they are equally brave in taking
financial risks. Women use interactive leadership styles by encouraging member participation
and sharing of power and information (Alimo-Metcalfe, 2010). Women not only think of their
own interests but also the interests of shareholders. This may encourage women commissioners
to pay dividends because dividends are one of the stakeholders' greatest interests. Thus, the
writer assumes that a female commissioner at the presidential level will make greater dividend
payments because this mechanism is in line with the company's goals.
H6. The Proportion of Women President Commissioner Positively Affects the Dividend
Payment Policy
3. Data and research design
3.1 Sample
This research focuses on Indonesia. The writer chose Indonesia because of several reasons.
First, as explained by Ferry (2016) that Indonesia does not have corporate governance
guidelines about gender diversity. Even though there are no special rules, Indonesia has a
higher gender diversity level because it applies a two-tier system. Second, Indonesia is still
included as a developing country. Developing countries tend to be low in investor rights
protection, so there is uncertainty in dividend payment. That is why the writer wants to indicate
the effect of gender diversity towards dividend payments in Indonesia.
The sampling method used in this research is purposive sampling with the criteria as
follows:
1. The companies noted in the Indonesian Stock Exchange 2012-2016.
2. Those having profit with positive value.
3. Paying cash dividends during 2012-2016 to shareholders and the nominal is stated in
the rupiah currency.
4. Companies providing annual reports and financial reports during the 2012-2016 period.
5. Having women as directors and commissioners.
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4. Research Methodology
A dividend is a profit sharing to the shareholders in the form of cash or stock. A higher dividend
payment to the shareholders can prevent some cash from flowing into the manager (Ben-Nasr,
2015), so a dividend is often used as one of the ways to reduce agency problems. Dividend
measurement is done by using the dividend payout ratio (DIVPR) as used in Amidu and Abor
(2006). DIVPR is often used to test the dividend in studies. DIVPR is formulated as dividend
per share to earnings per share.
As an independent variable, DDW is formulated as a total of women directors to a total
number of directors on the board. DKW is formulated as a total of women commissaries to a
total number of commissaries on the board. DDIW is formulated as a total of women
independent directors to a total number of directors on the board. DKIW is formulated as a
total of women independent commissaries to a total number of the commissaries on the board.
DDUW is formulated as a total of women president directors to a total number of directors on
board. DKUW is formulated as a total of women presidents commissioners to a total number
of commissioners.
As control variables, Firm size is formulated as total assets (log). ROA is formulated
as net profit to total assets. Industry types are grouped into three industrial types issued by the
Indonesian Stock Exchange consisting of: (1) main industry, (2) manufacture industry, and (3)
service industry. Those variables will be measured by using a dummy variable. Two industry
dummies are used to capture the industry effect since one of the three categories serves as a
reference category.
4.1 Research Model
The writer uses dividend payout ratio to measure the dividend payment to the shareholders.
The model to test our hypotheses is as follows:
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 =
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽6 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
Legends: DIVPR (Dividend Payout Ratio) = dividend per share/earning per share; DDW =
women directors/total number of directors; DKW=women commisioner/total number of
commisioner; DDIW = women independent directors/total number of directors; DKIW =
women independent commisioner/total number of commisioner; DDUW= women president
directors/total number of directors; DKUW= women president commisioner/ total number of
commisioner; Firmsize= total asset (log) ; ROA (Return of Asset) = net profit/total asset; IND
( Industry types) = grouped into three industry types measured by using dummy variable.
5.

Discussion

The object of this research is Indonesia because it has the third highest gender diversity after
the Philippines and Thailand, according to the report of Grant Thornton in 2015. This research
uses secondary data collected from the annual report or financial report of the companies
enlisted in the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2012-2016. This research uses the method of
purposive sampling with the criteria as follows:
Table 1. Sample
The population of the companies enlisted in 2012-2016
Not paying a dividend for five years consecutively
Paying dividends in US dollars
Negative value profit
10

1312
(953)
(40)
(24)

AABFJ Volume 16, Issue 6, 2022. Fauziah, Probohudono & Setiawan: Effect of Board Gender

Not having a women director or commissioner
Outliers data
The number of samples
Source: Secondary data that has been processed

(124)
(11)
160

From the data retrieval process, there are 171 companies that meet the criteria to be
sampled. However, there are 11 data belonging to data outliers, so these were omitted from the
sample. Thus, the sample to be used in this study amounts to 160.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics can give the data description through the comparison of minimum value,
maximum value, mean, and standard deviation.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics based on the Year

PANEL A 2012
N
DIVPR
DDW
DKW
DDIW
DKIW
DDUW
DKUW
FIRMSIZE
ROA
IND1
IND2

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
31
,08
,61
,2649
,14976
31
0,00
,67
,1910
,17251
31
0,00
,60
,1866
,16317
31
0,00
,33
,0307
,07968
31
0,00
,50
,0760
,13183
31
0,00
,33
,0148
,06323
31
0,00
,25
,0287
,07351
31 178227000000,0 111749000000000,0 16045660677419,4 29001210026051,4
31
,02
,26
,0887
,05679
31
0,00
1,00
,7742
,42502
31
,30054
0,00
1,00
,0968

PANEL B 2013
N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
DIVPR
31
,10
,58
,3135
,15100
DDW
31
0,00
,50
,1860
,17260
DKW
31
0,00
,60
,1803
,16873
DDIW
31
0,00
,50
,0559
,11418
DKIW
31
0,00
,67
,0935
,16400
DDUW
31
0,00
,33
,0280
,08907
DKUW
31
0,00
,33
,0297
,07878
FIRMSIZE 31 199353000000,0 131170000000000,0 14844340225806,5 26648834082963,5
ROA
31
,01
,32
,0839
,06375
IND1
31
0,00
1,00
,7419
,44480
IND2
31
0,00
1,00
,1290
,34078
PANEL C 2014
N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
DIVPR
34
,07
,72
,3096
,16642
DDW
34
0,00
,57
,1898
,18342
DKW
34
0,00
,67
,1805
,16120
DDIW
34
0,00
,50
,0659
,12180
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DKIW
DDUW
DKUW
FIRMSIZE

34
0,00
,33
,0642
,10922
34
0,00
,33
,0326
,08815
34
0,00
,25
,0328
,07058
34 242605000000,0 144582000000000,0 20432106617647,1 35694214549963,8
ROA
34
,00
,38
,0773
,06659
IND1
34
0,00
1,00
,7647
,43056
IND2
34
0,00
1,00
,1176
,32703
PANEL D 2015
N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
DIVPR
32
,09
,58
,3213
,14845
DDW
32
0,00
,55
,1889
,17632
DKW
32
0,00
,67
,2432
,15914
DDIW
32
0,00
,33
,0532
,10298
DKIW
32
0,00
,33
,0987
,11814
DDUW
32
0,00
,33
,0289
,08176
DKUW
32
0,00
,33
,0398
,08593
FIRMSIZE 32 282333000000,0 171808000000000,0 23539154468750,0 43108607656289,5
ROA
32
,00
,16
,0583
,03757
IND1
32
0,00
1,00
,7500
,43994
IND2
32
0,00
1,00
,1250
,33601
PANEL E 2016
DIVPR
DDW
DKW
DDIW
DKIW
DDUW
DKUW
FIRMSIZE
ROA
IND1
IND2

N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
32
,03
,75
,3027
,19002
32
0,00
,50
,2022
,16546
32
0,00
,67
,2310
,15053
32
0,00
,33
,0631
,09737
32
0,00
,33
,0910
,11373
32
0,00
,25
,0294
,07144
32
0,00
,25
,0255
,06550
32 386460000000,0 214168000000000,0 28407285312500,0 49950379185276,6
32
,00
,18
,0589
,04338
32
0,00
1,00
,7500
,43994
32
0,00
1,00
,1250
,33601

Legends : DIVPR(Dividend Payout Ratio) = dividend per share/earning per share; DDW = women directors/total
number of directors; DKW=women commisioner/total number of commisioner; DDIW= women independent
directors/total number of directors; DKIW = women independent commisioner/total number of commisioner;
DDUW= women president directors/total number of directors; DKUW=women president commisioner/ total
number of commisioner; Firmsize= total asset (log) ; ROA (Return of Asset)=net profit/total asset; IND ( Industry
types) = grouped into 3 industry types measured by using dummy variable.
Source:Secondary data that have been processed

Based on table 2 it can be seen that the dividend fluctuates every Year. Increases in 2013
but in 2014 decreased by 0.0039. Then there was an increase in 2015 of 0.0117 and a decline
again in 2016. The highest average DIVPR variable occurred in 2015 at 0.3213.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of women directors experiencing fluctuations. The women
board of directors (DDW) decreased in 2013 by 5% from 2012. Then, the increasing number
of women directors continue to occur from 2014 to 2016. Based on table 2, the highest DDW
average was in 2016 at 0, 2022. Figure 2 shows the proportion of women commissioners
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(DKW) also decreased in 2013 by 1%. Subsequently, an increase in the number of women
commissioners continued to occur from 2014 to 2016. Table 2 shows the highest average of
0.2432 occurring in 2015. Overall, figure 2 shows that the number of women in 2012-2014 was
mostly in director positions, but in 2015-2016 there was a significant increase in women who
became a commissioner.
Table 2 shows the highest average in the independent women director variable (DDIW)
in 2014 of 0.0659. Figure 3 shows the number of independent women directors continuing to
increase. While the proportion of women independent commissioners (DKIW) variable
showed an increase and decrease. The increase occurred in 2013 but declined in 2014 by 1%.
A significant increase in the number of DKIW re-occurs in 2015 and 2016. Table 2 shows the
highest average occurred in 2015 amounted to 0.0987. As a whole, Figure 2 shows that more
women are in independent commissioners positions. Women also tend to sit on committeerelated supervision, particularly in assigned to audit corporate governance (Adams and Ferreira
2009).
Figure 4 shows the number of women president directors (DDUW) having increased and
decreased. The number of directors that occurred in 2014 was as many as six people. Table 3
shows the highest mean for president women directors variable (DDUW) of 0,0326 in 2014.
The president-women commissioner variable (DKUW) also fluctuated. There was a 0.2%
decrease in 2013 and a significant increase in 2014 by 1%. Table 3 shows the highest average
of 0.0398 in 2015 and the lowest average of 0.0255 in 2016. Overall the number of women
who occupy the positions of president, director and president commissioners tends to be low.
Schein's (1975) study results show the profile of successful managers closer to the profile of
men than to ordinary women so that the position of men as leaders is considered more
appropriate than women.
The highest ROA value was in 2014 at 0.38, and the highest average of 0.0887 in 2012.
The firm size variable (FIRMSIZE) continues to increase every year, and the highest average
is Rp 28.407.285.312.500 in the year 2016.
Figure 2. Comparison of Proportion of Women Directors and Women Commissioners
Per Year
25%
20%
15%

women directors

10%

women commisioners

5%
0%

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Source: Secondary data that has been processed
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Figure 3. Comparison of Proportion of Independent Women Directors and Independent
Women Commissioners Per Year
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Source: Secondary data that has been processed
Figure 4. Comparison of Proportion of President Women Directors and President
Women Commissioners Per Year
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Source: Secondary data that has been processed
5.2 Hypothesis Examination Result
Table 4. Regression Result based on Variable (Pooled Data)
VARIABLE
TAHUN
N
MEAN
t
DDW
2012
31
,1910
2013
31
,1860
2014
34
,1898
-4,220
2015
32
,1889
2016
32
,2022
TOTAL
160
,9580
DKW
2012
31
,1866
2013
31
,1803
2014
34
,1805
1,821
2015
32
,2432
2016
32
,2310
TOTAL
160
1,0215
DDIW
2012
31
,0307
2013
31
,0559
2014
34
,0659
2,221
2015
32
,0532
2016
32
,0631
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Sig

,000*

,071***

,028**

AABFJ Volume 16, Issue 6, 2022. Fauziah, Probohudono & Setiawan: Effect of Board Gender

DKIW

DDUW

DKUW

ROA

IND1

IND2

FIRMSIZE

TOTAL
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
TOTAL
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
TOTAL
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
TOTAL
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
TOTAL
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
TOTAL
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
TOTAL
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
TOTAL

160
31
31
34
32
32
160
31
31
34
32
32
160
31
31
34
32
32
160
31
31
34
32
32
160
31
31
34
32
32
160
31
31
34
32
32
160
31
31
34
32
32
160

,2687
,0760
,0935
,0642
,0987
,0910
,4235
,0148
,0280
,0326
,0289
,0294
,1337
,0287
,0297
,0328
,0398
,0255
,1565
,0887
,0839
,0773
,0583
,0589
,3670
,7742
,7419
,7647
,7500
,7500
3,7808
,0968
,1290
,1176
,1250
,1250
,5935
1,60457E+13
1,48443E+13
2,04321E+13
2,35392E+13
2,84073E+13
1,03269E+14

*significant at 1% level, **significant at5% level, ***significant at 10% level
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-,513

,609

2,547

,012**

2,150

,033**

1,245

,215

,222

,824

,776

,439

-1,457

,439
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Legends : DIVPR(Dividend Payout Ratio) = dividend per share/earning per share; DDW = women directors/total
number of directors; DKW=women commisioner/total number of commisioner; DDIW = women independent
directors/total number of directors; DKIW = women independent commissioner/total number of commissioners;
DDUW= women president directors/total number of directors; DKUW= women president commissioner/ total
number of the commissioner; Firmsize= total asset (log); ROA (Return of Asset) = net profit/total asset; IND (
Industry types) = grouped into three industry types measured by using a dummy variable.
Source: Secondary data that has been processed

Table 4 gives results based on predictor variables. Regression results from the predictor
variables in five years revealed that there was a significant influence with significance values
at the level of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Table 4 shows the women director (DDW) negatively
affecting dividend payouts and having a significance value of 0,000 (p-value <0.01). This
indicates that more and more women directors will reduce the dividends paid. Then, the
existence of women on the board of commissioners (DKW) has a positive effect on dividend
payments with a significance value of 0.071 (p-value <0.1). This indicates that more and more
women commissioners will increase the dividends paid. The woman who served as an
independent commissioner (DDIW) also positively influenced the payment of dividends with
a value of 0.28 (p-value <0.05). So more and more independent women directors will
encourage higher dividend payouts. The president director of women (DDUW) also positively
influences the payment of dividends with a value of 0,012 (p-value <0,05). This indicates that
women directors will pay more attention to the interests of shareholders, such as dividends.
The president women commissioner (DKUW) also positively influences the dividend payout
with a value of 0.033 (p-value <0.05). This indicates that presidential women commissioners
will pay more attention to the welfare of shareholders.
In the women's independent commissioner (DKIW) variable, ROA, industry type, and
firm size have significant values more than equal to 10%, so it can be said that those variables
do not affect dividend payout. So there are other factors outside the research that may affect
dividend payouts.
4.3.Discussion
The hypothesis examination result shows that the effect of women directors on dividend
payment is negatively significant; it means that the increase in the number of women directors
will increase the chance to pay a lower dividend because women directors will tend to hold the
cash during the market uncertainty which mostly happens in the countries with developing
economy. Based on the research result, H1 is accepted. The result of this research supports the
research done by Saeed and Sameer (2017) that the existence of women directors negatively
affects dividend payment. It is proven that women tend to avoid risk because their attitude is
more sensitive to risks (Hillman et al., 2007). Based on the research done by Marter and
Lighthall (2012), there is a tendency for a woman to be cautious when she faces risky
conditions so that she will tend to avoid risk. Therefore, conditions of market uncertainty may
cause a woman director to hold the cash by reducing the dividend payment.
The hypothesis examination result also shows that the effect of women commissioners
on dividend payment is positively significant; it means that the increase in the number of
women commissioners can increase the number of dividends paid. Based on the research result,
H2 is accepted. The result of this research supports the research done by Purcheta-Martinez
and Bel-Oms (2015), Chen et al. (2017), Byoun (2016), and Van Pelt (2013) stating that the
existence of women on the commissioner board positively affects the dividend payment. Easy
access to resources is possible because of women's ability to build communication channels
and harmony with the external stakeholders to reduce agency problems and gain support and
also create legitimacy in the external environment (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Women seem
to have comparative superiority regarding product diversity and tasks related to communication
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(Schubert, 2006). The harmony with the shareholders makes the commissioner knows what is
wanted by the shareholders and act for the importance of the company or the stakeholders. So,
there is no reason for them to hold the cash
The results of hypothesis testing show that the effect of the existence of independent
women directors on dividend payout is positively significant. Based on the result of this
research, H3 is accepted. This study supports Prasanna (2014) that independent directors prefer
to pay dividends because independent directors can limit the opportunistic behavior of
managers that often harms shareholders. They can supervise directly with an adequate payment
system to align shareholder and management interests such as dividends (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1994). Independent parties are representatives of shareholders, so they will act in
accordance with shareholder expectations, one of which is to distribute dividends. These results
indicate the role of independent women directors able to play effectively.
The hypothesis examination shows that there is no effect caused by the women
independent commissioner on dividend payment. Based on the research result, H4 is rejected.
It shows that the role of women independent commissioners seems less effective in reducing
asymmetric information between the owner and the management. The result of this research
supports the research done by Chen (2017) and Abdelsalam, El-Masry and Elsegini (2008).
Women independent commissioners may participate less in the decision-making process.
Based on the research done by Darmadi (2013), an independent commissioner is less
independent because most of the companies in Indonesia are owned by families, so the control
from the family dominates the process of decision-making, so it is hard for an independent
commissioner to act independently. The independent party may not have the mandate,
incentive and ability to monitor management strictly (Gutierrez and Sáez, 2012).
The hypothesis examination result shows that the effect of the existence of women
president directors towards dividend payment is positively significant; it means that an increase
in the number of women executive directors can increase the number of dividends paid. Based
on the research result, H3a is rejected. Improving control mechanisms can also help the
company to reduce agency problems. Based on the research result, the hypothesis is rejected.
The result of this research contradicts the one done by Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2007), stating
that executive directors tend not to support dividend payment because this mechanism needs a
lot of supervision of the management actions. This research proves that paying attention to the
shareholders' welfare is the main goal of a company. One of the ways to improve the
shareholders' welfare is by paying a dividend.
The hypothesis examination result shows that the effect of the women president
commissioner's existence on dividend payment is positively significant. It means that women
president commissioners may increase dividend payments. Based on the result of this research,
H6 is accepted. Women tend to focus on control mechanisms (Gul et al., 2011). Improving
control mechanisms on management can also help companies reduce agency problems and
encourage higher dividend payouts because stricter controls can reduce the opportunistic
actions of managers. This study proves that there is a positive influence between women
directors and dividend payouts. The governance structure in Indonesia shows that both
directors and commissioners are responsible to shareholders. So, the managers of the company
will act according to what the shareholders want, such as paying dividends to protect his/her
position.
6. Conclusion
Based on the result of this research, it can be concluded that the existence of women directors
can reduce the dividend payment because women directors tend to reduce financial risks often
occurring in developing countries because of the market uncertainty condition. It indicates that
dividend payment is not able to reduce agency problems that happen from the conflicts between
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the owner and management. However, the existence of women commissioners can also
increase dividend payments because they will demand more control mechanisms from the
management team and make better decisions that positively impact the shareholders. An
independent women director can pay a higher dividend because they can reduce opportunistic
actions that can harm shareholders.Women independent commissioners have no effect on the
dividend payment because most big companies in Indonesia are owned by some families. The
dominating family control causes the independent commissioners to be uneasy about acting
independently. They are not able to give effective supervision to the management yet, so there
is a possibility that agency problems will arise. Furthermore, women president directors and
women president commissioners positively affect the dividend payment because, as a leader,
it is a must for her to pay attention to the shareholders' welfare. One of the ways to do that is
by paying a dividend. The existence of ROA, type of industry, and firm size do not affect
dividend payment.
Domestic and international institutions are getting more and more focused on the
gender equity of workforces in developing countries. That is why this research recommends
that companies increase gender diversity at the management level to create a better decisionmaking system because women and men can see risks from different points of view. Investors
also have to insist that companies give a chance for the women to sit at the executive level
because they can show good performance and can satisfy the shareholders. The government
also has to strengthen and develop gender equity in the workforce to raise more awareness
about the benefits of gender diversity at the top of the leadership.
In this research, there are several limitations. One of them is the limited sample. In
Indonesia, the dividend payment is not an obligation. The dividend will be shared if the
company gets profits. Moreover, women are still regarded as a minority on the board, whether
as directors or commissioners. Based on those limitations, the writer suggests several things
for future research; they are: (1) making a comparison with other countries because there is a
possibility that each developing countries have different characteristics; (2) researching further
the background of women director and women commissioner because the characteristics of
women avoiding risks may be affected by their background.
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